Mahathaya and Prabhakaran: A Bond Beyond the Battlefield
Mahathaya (Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja), Once a prominent figure within the LTTE and seen as the deputy leader and public face of the organization, faced a dramatic downfall when he was arrested in August 1993 by the LTTE itself. He was accused of colluding with India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in a plot to assassinate Prabhakaran and other key LTTE leaders. After enduring 16 months of captivity, Mahathaya was executed on December 28, 1994. This year marks the 29th anniversary of his execution.
The arrest of Mahathaya, coupled with the allegations leveled against him, sparked widespread speculation and disbelief among observers and LTTE supporters alike, particularly considering his previously close relationship with Prabhakaran. His fall from grace and the subsequent execution were seen as indicative of the complex and often perilous internal politics of the LTTE.
Credible sources who were formerly associated with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have shared in-depth insights with the Jaffna Monitor, shedding light on the complex dynamics that led to the downfall of Mahathaya. According to these sources, a key factor in Mahathaya’s decline was the combination of LTTE leader Veluppillai Prabhakaran’s insecurities and paranoia, along with the intense paranoia about the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of India that had enveloped Pottu Amman, the head of LTTE’s intelligence wing. These sources also highlighted Pottu Amman’s ambition to climb the ranks within the LTTE, which significantly influenced the unfolding events. Following Mahathaya’s downfall, Pottu Amman rose to a position of greater power, becoming the undeclared but effective second-in-command of the LTTE, a role that Mahathaya had previously occupied
Mahathaya, once a trusted deputy of the LTTE leader Prabhakaran, shared a deep connection with him that extended beyond their roles in the organization. Both hailed from Valvettithurai, a significant location in the Sri Lankan armed struggle, belonged to the same caste, the Karaiyar caste (Traditionally, the Karaiyar were known as a seafaring and fishing community), and were alumni of Chidambaram College. Their close association was also marked by their proximity in age, with Prabhakaran born in 1954 and Mahathaya in 1956, leading some to speculate about their familial relationship.
Mahathaya’s journey with the LTTE began in 1978 and was significantly influenced by Prabhakaran. He was personally chosen by Prabhakaran to join the ranks of the LTTE. Initially known within the LTTE as ‘Sri,’ and ‘Ajit’. Mahathaya’s identity evolved over time. A source who interacted with him extensively in India between 1981 and 1983 disclosed to the Jaffna Monitor that he was known as ‘Sri’ during this period. However, by 1985, he had become widely recognized as ‘Mahathaya’ within the LTTE circles. A former prominent member of the LTTE disclosed to the Jaffna Monitor that Mahathaya was also known by the nickname ‘Mokku’ Mahathaya. The term’ nkhf;F (Mokku) in Tamil is often used colloquially to describe someone who is dumb or an idiot.
There is a common misconception regarding how Mahathaya came to be known by his name, which in the Sinhala language means “sir,” a term of respect. Contrary to the belief that he acquired this name after leading peace talks with the Premadasa Government in 1989, sources who worked closely with Mahathaya have clarified that he was actually referred to as Mahathaya as early as 1984.
Mahathaya and the LTTE: Unconventional Training and Indian Government’s Role
Contrary to popular belief, Mahathaya did not receive formal military training in any of the LTTE’s official training batches. The first military training camp for LTTE cadres was conducted in Udayarkattu, located in the Mullaitivu District, during February, March, and April 1983. This pioneering training camp was led by none other than the LTTE chief Prabhakaran himself. About 25 members participated in this initial training session. Among the attendees were several prominent LTTE figures including Kittu, Pottu Amman, Sellakili, Ponnamman, Pulendran, and Lala Ranjan. It’s important to highlight that at this time, the LTTE was still a relatively small guerrilla group, comprising no more than 30 members. Sources present at this first camp told the Jaffna Monitor that, although Mahathaya was seen a few times at the campsite, he did not participate in the training.
Following the 1983 violence, the Indian government under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi covertly provided military training to various Tamil militant groups from Sri Lanka, including the LTTE. The first two LTTE training camps, conducted in Uttar Pradesh and Jawalamukhi in the Kangra district of Himachal Pradesh, North India, were part of this clandestine operation. These sessions, known within the LTTE as batch-1 and batch-2, featured direct training from Indian Army personnel. This secret military assistance was a component of a broader initiative by the Indira Gandhi government to offer similar training to other Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups, though in different locations
The first batch of LTTE cadres sent to India for military training was kept unaware of their exact location, a strategy by the Indian government and RAW to maintain discretion. The secrecy surrounding the training was crucial due to the sensitive implications of providing arms training to a foreign militant group. The militants were transported via long routes and isolated from the public to ensure confidentiality and prevent potential future disclosures. While the trainees were aware that they were in Uttar Pradesh, the exact location of their training site was deliberately kept undisclosed.
Similarly, the second batch of LTTE cadres sent for training was covertly transported. They embarked on a two-day bus journey from Delhi’s Hazrat Nizamuddin railway station, taking a deliberately longer route to maintain secrecy. Ingeniously, two trainees from this batch, Raheem and Suseelan, managed to deduce their location. They identified their whereabouts as ‘Jawalamukhi,’ a small village in the Kangra district of Himachal Pradesh, by noting the name on a post office board. It’s worth noting that Suseelan, recognized for his mechanical skills, was later tragically killed following the Mahathaya case within the LTTE. Additionally, insiders from these training batches confirmed that Mahathaya was not a participant in these training sessions.
LTTE’s Tamil Nadu Training and Prabhakaran’s Superstitions
The first two batches of LTTE training in India were conducted by the Indian government. Following these, the LTTE organized seven additional training batches in Tamil Nadu. These sessions were led by trainers, referred to as ‘masters’ in LTTE parlance, who themselves had been trained during the initial batches overseen by Indian authorities. Notably, the first batch of these LTTE-conducted sessions (the third batch overall), along with the 6th and 10th batches, took place in Kumbarapatti, a small mountain hamlet in the Kolathur area of Salem district. Over time, this village, Kumbarapatti, became known as ‘Puliyur’ – meaning ‘village of the tigers’ in Tamil – a name that emerged as a tribute to the LTTE training camps established there.
The 4th and 7th batches of LTTE training took place in Sirumalai, Dindigul, at an estate owned by a close aide of Pazha Nedumaran, Dindigul Alagirisamy. The 5th and 9th batches were conducted in Rajapalayam Koomapatti. Notably, the 7th batch was exclusively for women. An interesting aspect of these training batches is that they were numbered from 1 to 10, yet there were only nine batches in total. This is because there was no 8th batch. The omission of the 8th batch was due to Prabhakaran’s superstition; he considered the number 8 unlucky. Sources told the Jaffna Monitor that this belief was firmly held by the LTTE supremo until the 1990s. Sources who were part of these training batches informed the Jaffna Monitor that Mahathaya did not participate in any of these sessions.
This lack of formal military training was not unique to Mahathaya. Other prominent LTTE figures, such as Baby Subramaniam, the Head of the Tamil Eelam Education Department; Col. Shankar, founder of the LTTE’s air wing and marine division; Anton Master, former head of Military Office (MO) and Nadeshan, the LTTE’s Political wing Leader, also reportedly did not participate in formal training camps. Like these individuals, Mahathaya was thrust into military ranks within the LTTE without undergoing conventional military training. However, it is understood that these individuals, including Mahathaya, received military training in some form somewhere.
Man of the people
People and former LTTE fighters who closely interacted with Mahathaya shared their insights with the Jaffna Monitor, emphasizing that Mahathaya was a man of the people. Like Captain Pandithar (S. Ravindran), who was known to be a childhood friend of Prabhakaran and served as a Jaffna commander until his death in January 1985, Mahathaya also possessed a remarkable ability to connect with people easily. His capability to engage with individuals and sway them into supporting the LTTE was notable. Indeed, at a certain juncture, Mahathaya effectively led the LTTE’s public relations (PR) efforts, even though there was no formally designated PR unit within the organization. His role in this capacity was significant, as he played a crucial role in shaping the LTTE’s interactions and image with the public, leveraging his ability to connect with people and communicate the group’s objectives and perspectives.
In 1984, Mahathaya was appointed as the Vanni regional commander of the LTTE by Prabhakaran. The Vanni region, encompassing the districts of Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya, was a crucial area for the LTTE. Sources within the LTTE have stated that Mahathaya served effectively as the Vanni commander. Significantly, in 1987, when the LTTE leadership had to relocate its Base to the Vanni region amidst the conflict with the Indian Peace Keeping Force, Mahathaya’s network and contacts in the area proved invaluable. His connections and familiarity with the Vanni region greatly assisted Prabhakaran and the LTTE in establishing their new Base and continuing their operations during this critical period.
Behind the Scenes: Mahathaya’s Appointment as LTTE’s Deputy Leader
Mahathaya’s role in the history of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is indeed significant, as he was the first and ultimately the last person to be designated as the Deputy Leader of the organization. This position was not reestablished following Mahathaya’s arrest and execution. Despite the lack of official documentation, credible sources have confirmed to the Jaffna Monitor that Mahathaya was appointed deputy leader by LTTE leader Prabhakaran in 1987.
Before the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord on July 29, 1987, the Indian government extended an invitation to Prabhakaran for discussions in New Delhi. Initially reluctant, Prabhakaran eventually agreed to the visit. On July 24, 1987, he was flown from the Suthumalai Amman temple grounds to Chennai aboard an Indian Army military helicopter. From Chennai, he continued his journey to Delhi on a military flight. Accompanying him from Suthumalai were key LTTE figures ‘Yogi’ Yogaratnam and Thileepan, along with Hardeep Puri, who was then serving as the 1st Secretary of the Indian High Commission and is currently a Minister in Narendra Modi’s Government. In Chennai, Prabhakaran was joined by Anton Balasingham, the LTTE’s chief political strategist, for the trip to Delhi.
Before leaving for Delhi, Prabhakaran internally announced within the LTTE that Mahathaya would assume the role of Deputy Leader in his absence. While this appointment was not formalized through public statements or documented evidence, sources confirmed that Prabhakaran explicitly directed his cadres to adhere to Mahathaya’s orders during his absence.
Differing Perspectives on Mahathaya’s Path to LTTE Leadership
Within the ranks of former LTTE members who spoke to the Jaffna Monitor, a divergence of opinion exists regarding the reasons behind Mahathaya’s initial rise within the LTTE.
One school of thought suggests that Mahathaya’s elevation was primarily due to his close relationship with Prabhakaran. These former members pointed out that Prabhakaran had known Mahathaya for a long time, and both hailed from the same place, Valvettithurai. This geographical and personal connection reportedly led Prabhakaran to view Mahathaya as harmless and trustworthy. Sources suggest that Prabhakaran’s perception of Mahathaya significantly aided his rise within the LTTE. Additionally, sources pointed out to Jaffna monitor that Prabhakaran believed Mahathaya, colloquially known as ‘Mokku Mahathaya,’ was not a competitor for his leadership. This belief that Mahathaya could not effectively challenge Prabhakaran’s authority, sources believe, further contributed to Mahathaya’s elevation in the organization.
However, this view is contested by another group of former LTTE members. They believe Mahathaya’s rise was more circumstantial, particularly following Kittu’s departure to Chennai. They point out that Baby Subramaniam, following Prabhakaran, was the most senior member of the LTTE. However, due to Baby Subramaniam’s non-military background, Mahathaya, who followed him in terms of seniority, was the natural choice for a prominent position within the LTTE’s military and operational framework.
Arrival of the IPKF
Following the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord on July 29, 1987, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) entered Jaffna on July 30, 1987, as part of their mission in Sri Lanka. Initially, the arrival of the IPKF in Jaffna was met with a warm welcome from the local population. Unaware of the future implications, the people of Jaffna greeted the IPKF troops with garlands and flowers.
Kittu’s Attack and the Rise of Mahathaya in the LTTE
On the night of March 29, 1987, approximately 4 and a half months before the IPKF entered Sri Lankan soil, An unidentified assailant attacked the Mitsubishi Lancer carrying Kittu on Jaffna’s Second Cross Street. When the attack happened, Kittu was en route to meet his girlfriend, Cynthia, a medical student at Jaffna University. The assailant fired at the vehicle and lobbed a powerful grenade; Kittu suffered a severe injury, with his right leg being virtually severed, an injury that led to its eventual amputation. This marked the end of Kittu’s long and distinguished military career with the LTTE.
Following this life-altering incident, Kittu relocated to Chennai, where he took charge of the LTTE’s propaganda office. The perpetrator of this attack remains unidentified to this day, with even the once-powerful LTTE intelligence wing under Pottu Amman’s leadership failing to determine who was behind it.
This incident, however, had a significant repercussion within the LTTE ranks. It paved the way for Mahathaya to ascend within the organization. With Kittu’s move to Chennai and his shift away from active military involvement, Mahathaya’s prominence within the LTTE increased substantially. He returned to Jaffna from the Vanni region and took on a more central role, overseeing military actions against Indian forces.
The rising popularity of Mahathaya
The relationship between the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) took a significant turn for the worse, ultimately leading to open conflict. By October 1987, the tensions between the two groups had escalated to the point of full-scale warfare.
In December 1987, following intense clashes with Indian forces, the LTTE retreated to the Vanni region. In this strategic move, Prabhakaran established his Base in Nittakaikkulam, Mullaitivu, while Mahathaya set up his Base in Omanthai Koliyankulam. During this critical period, Mahathaya’s connections and deep familiarity with the Vanni region greatly assisted Prabhakaran and the LTTE in establishing their new bases and continuing their operations.
During the fight, LTTE had captured 18 Indian Army soldiers and, in a move aimed at enhancing their public relations, decided to hand these soldiers over to Indian authorities. This gesture was designed to attract media attention and took place in the presence of prominent Indian journalists. The handover events were held in Chavakachcheri and Uduvil, with Mahathaya at the forefront, personally overseeing the process. Adding to the significance of these events, Raheem, described in a WikiLeaks cable as the “trilingual aristocrat” and spokesperson for Kittu, arrived in Jaffna on an Indian Army flight from Chennai, accompanied by about 15 Indian journalists.
This strategic move by the LTTE was not only to boost its image but also stemmed from practical considerations. The LTTE, engaged in intense warfare and continually on the move, was not equipped to detain prisoners of war. Furthermore, there was a conscious decision not to harm these soldiers. Raheem candidly expressed to the Jaffna Monitor that the captured soldiers were not viewed as significant adversaries. Furthermore, there was an element of seeking ‘vilasam,’ a Tamil term playfully used here to mean publicity, especially after inflicting significant blows on the world’s fourth-largest army. The event was widely covered in prominent newspapers worldwide. This occasion received Mahathaya, Shankar, Raheem along with IPKF officers talking to press persons after handing over 18 IPKF soldiers to Indian authorities.
considerable global attention. The coverage of this event not only brought substantial publicity to the LTTE but also particularly highlighted Mahathaya’s role in the process. The image of Mahathaya alongside Brigadier Manjit Singh Minhas during the handover became emblematic of this moment. This act and its extensive news coverage significantly enhanced Mahathaya’s status in the international arena. It showcased him as a key player in the LTTE’s interactions with external entities.
Media Spotlight on Mahathaya: The Face of LTTE in Peace Talks
During this period, anti-India sentiment escalated in southern Sri Lanka. In the 1988 presidential election, held on December 19, Ranasinghe Premadasa succeeded J.R. Jayewardene amidst a backdrop of conflict in the north and east between the Indian Peace Keeping Force and LTTE and violence in the south involving government forces and Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna militants. Both major political parties in the election pledged to revoke the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and sought the withdrawal of Indian troops.
By this time, the LTTE, also cornered in the Sri Lankan jungles by the IPKF, sought a strategic pause. To achieve this, they initiated peace talks with President Premadasa’s government, guided by the Tamil adage “an enemy’s enemy is my friend.” The primary goal of these talks was to facilitate the withdrawal of Indian forces from Sri Lanka. The Premadasa government, aiming to fulfill a key election promise of expelling Indian troops from Sri Lanka, initiated peace talks with the LTTE.
In an effort to lend credibility and a formal structure to their negotiations with the LTTE, the Premadasa government advised the LTTE to establish a political party. This move aimed to provide a legitimate platform for dialogue and facilitate a more structured approach to peace talks. Prabhakaran approved the formation of a political party for the LTTE, the People’s Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT), or Viduthalai Pulikal Makkal Munnani, appointing Mahathaya as its head and “Yogi” Yogaratham as its Secretary.
The peace talks garnered immense media coverage, both locally and internationally. The LTTE delegation, led by Mahathaya, was accommodated in Colombo as guests of the Sri Lankan government, staying in five-star hotels and participating in the negotiations. During this time, Mahathaya became the talk of the town, with his presence and activities extensively featured in TV, newspapers, and magazines, marking a peak in his public visibility.
Mahathaya’s Omnipresence and Prabhakaran’s Insecurity
Trustworthy sources from the LTTE told the Jaffna Monitor that the rising prominence and public acknowledgment of Mahathaya caused uneasiness for Prabhakaran, his Leader, who had a reputation for being insecure. A former prominent LTTE leader, who is currently living in exile and chose to remain anonymous, shared insightful reflections with the ‘Jaffna Monitor’ magazine about the atmosphere during Mahathaya’s peak popularity. He described a time when Mahathaya’s presence was ubiquitous in the media: “If you woke up and read the newspaper, there was Mahathaya; if you turned on your radio, there was Mahathaya. His name was virtually everywhere.” This omnipresence in the media made Mahathaya a household name, significantly elevating his profile. The former Leader further argued that such widespread recognition could easily lead to feelings of insecurity in others, especially in a person like Prabhakaran, known for his inherent insecurities.
The LTTE’s Strategic Blunder: Mahathaya’s Role in the Amirthalingam Assassination
On July 13, 1989, amidst ongoing peace talks between an official LTTE delegation and President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s government in Colombo, Appapillai Amirthalingam, the Leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), and former TULF Jaffna MP Vettivelu Yogeswaran were assassinated on Colombo’s Bullers Road. The assailants, Rasiah Aravindarajah (Visu), Peter Aloysius Leon (Vigna), and Sivakumar (Arivu), active members of the LTTE, were known as Mahathaya’s men and were linked directly to him, who was at the time leading the LTTE’s peace negotiations. These killings carried out under the orders of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, resulted in the assassins being gunned down by Amirthalingam’s security officer, Nissanka Thibbotumunuwa. Despite initial denials by the LTTE’s political wing and its General Secretary, Yogaratnam Yogi, the involvement of the LTTE, and particularly Mahathaya’s faction, in these assassinations was widely recognized and condemned.
The assassination, while achieving its immediate goal, is considered a significant tactical and strategic blunder by the LTTE, a view echoed not only by external observers but also by former LTTE cadres, as told to us (Jaffna Monitor). Several reasons contribute to this perception of failure. One crucial aspect was the loss of two valuable LTTE members, Visu and Vigna. Former LTTE leaders, now living in exile and speaking anonymously with the Jaffna Monitor, provided insight into this view. They noted that before Amirthalingam’s assassination, the LTTE had primarily conducted a single major suicide attack on July 5, 1987, against the Sri Lankan army at Nelliady Madhya Maha Vidyalayam, executed by Vallipuram Vasanthan, also known as Captain Miller, the first Black Tiger. The second suicide attack attributed to the LTTE was the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, although the LTTE never officially claimed the attack or included the assassin, Thanu, in their list of Great Heroes (Maveerar). These ex-leaders criticized the planning and execution of Amirthalingam’s assassination, orchestrated by Mahathaya’s group, likening it to an unplanned suicide attack. They argued that Amirthalingam, a political figure, and not a military target, could have been assassinated in numerous other ways that wouldn’t have resulted in the loss of key LTTE operatives. Instead, they described the approach taken – attacking Amirthalingam in his own home, surrounded by his loyal bodyguards – as tactically unsound and counterproductive, illustrating a significant lapse in strategic judgment by the Mahathaya’s team. This decision reflected a considerable lapse in strategic judgment on Mahathaya’s part and exposed a significant deficiency in planning and military prowess within his team.
This incident significantly impacted the LTTE’s public perception and image. The operation inadvertently revealed the LTTE’s direct involvement despite their initial denials. Historically, the LTTE had frequently denied involvement in specific assassinations, often utilizing its propaganda tools to deflect responsibility and preserve its public image. However, the bodies of LTTE members Visu, Vigna, and Arivu served as undeniable evidence of the LTTE’s involvement. This event, almost akin to an unintended exhibition, starkly exposed the reality of the LTTE’s tactics, undermining their attempts to portray themselves as a peace-loving organization amid ongoing negotiations with the Sri Lankan government.
camp in Rajapalayam, Tamil Nadu. This photo is significant as it provides evidence of Visu being trained in the LTTE’s camp
The assassination also highlighted the LTTE’s contradictory actions. On one hand, they were engaged in peace talks, while on the other, they were executing high-profile assassinations. This inconsistency raised doubts about their true intentions and commitment to peace, suggesting a deceptive strategy of feigning peace negotiations while continuing to engage in acts of violence.
Moreover, this incident drew strong international criticism and led to increased isolation for the LTTE. The assassination of a prominent political leader during peace negotiations was perceived as a direct attack on, and a significant setback to, the peace efforts in Sri Lanka. The global community condemned this act, viewing it as an aggressive move that significantly hampered the prospects of resolving the conflict in the country.
While there are individuals loyal to both Amirthalingam and Prabhakaran who contend that Amirthalingam’s murder was orchestrated and executed by Mahathaya independently, without the consent of LTTE supremo Prabhakaran, former senior leaders of the LTTE disagree with this assertion. In conversations with the Jaffna Monitor, these ex- leaders have described such a claim as absurd. They argue that given the hierarchical structure of the LTTE, it would have been impossible for Mahathaya to plan and carry out a high-profile assassination like that of Amirthalingam without direct orders from Prabhakaran. The organizational framework of the LTTE was such that operations, especially those of significant magnitude and impact, required approval and directives from the top leadership.
Credible sources indicate that Prabhakaran was angered by the loss of three guards and the public exposure of the LTTE’s involvement in the assassination. Despite this, he remained largely unaffected by the criticism directed towards him and the organization.
The First Great Heroes Day at Punithabhoomi: Prabhakaran’s Confession on the Assassination of Amirthalingam
A few months after the assassination of Amirthalingam, the LTTE observed its first annual “Maaveerar Naal,” or Great Heroes Day, on November 27, 1989. This date was chosen by Prabhakaran to coincide with the anniversary of the death of Selvachandran Sathiyanathan, alias Lieutenant Shankar or Suresh, the first LTTE member to die in combat on November 27, 1982. Prabhakaran selected November 27 as Great Heroes Day to remember and honour all the fallen LTTE fighters.
The first Great Heroes Day was a sombre and restricted event, with the highlight being an emotional speech delivered by Prabhakaran to his followers in Nittakaikkulam, Mullaitivu, where he had established his temporary camp. The specific site of the speech was known as ‘Punithabhoomi’ or ‘sacred land’ in Tamil. This area, designated within the Nittakaikkulam base, was more than just the location for the speech; it was also where Prabhakaran, along with his loyal bodyguards, resided. Interestingly, the Base where Velupillai Prabhakaran lived was named ‘Punitha Bhoomi’ by Prabhakaran himself.
Punithabhoomi base in Nittakaikkulam, Mullaitivu
Punithabhoomi base in Nittakaikkulam, Mullaitivu, during peace talks with the Premadasa government.
During the first Great Heroes Day speech, an LTTE member who was present and later spoke to the Jaffna Monitor recalled that Prabhakaran acknowledged responsibility for the assassination of Amirthalingam. Interestingly, this part of his speech was subsequently edited from the video cassette circulated among the Tamil Diaspora. The source conveyed that Prabhakaran justified the assassination by stating that although Amirthalingam had initially supported the Tamil Eelam cause, he ultimately betrayed it. In his speech, Prabhakaran emphasized the seriousness of such a betrayal, declaring that anyone who betrays the Tamil Eelam cause, including himself, deserved to be killed.
Mahathaya’s Tribute to Visu and Its Implications
Initially, the LTTE did not include the men who assassinated Amirthalingam and were subsequently killed by his bodyguards in their Maaveerar (Great Heroes) list. However, in early 1990, while peace talks with the Premadasa government were still ongoing, Mahathaya visited the home of Visu, an LTTE operative killed at Amirthalingam’s house, in Nelliyadi to offer condolences to his parents. During this visit, credible sources suggest he was confronted by Visu’s parents about their son’s exclusion from the Maaveerar list. Emotionally driven, Mahathaya responded by publicly posting a condolence notice for Visu and posthumously promoting him to the rank of Major. This act was significant because, at the time, the LTTE was still vehemently denying any involvement in Amirthalingam’s assassination. Therefore, Mahathaya’s actions were interpreted as an implicit admission within the LTTE of their role in the killing. This incident was particularly notable as it suggested a divergence in approach between Mahathaya and Prabhakaran. Credible sources indicate that Mahathaya’s decision to independently honor Visu without consulting Prabhakaran created uneasiness in Prabhakaran’s mind. Known for his insecure nature, Prabhakaran likely viewed Mahathaya’s independent action as a challenge to his authority and control within the organization.
Inside the LTTE: Flattery, Surveillance, and Power Play
Contrary to the popular belief that Prabhakaran was indifferent to praise or criticism, credible sources disclosed to the Jaffna Monitor that he valued and often encouraged commendation. These sources noted that key figures in Prabhakaran’s inner circle, including Pottu Amman, Col. Shankar, Tamilselvan, and others, were known to frequently engage in what appeared to be excessive flattery towards their Leader.
This inclination for flattery was further highlighted in an incident shared by a former LTTE member with the Jaffna Monitor. On Prabhakaran’s 50th birthday on November 26, 2004, Babu, alias ‘Holser’ Babu, the chief of Cheran Vanipam, an LTTE business outlet, organized a massive Pongal ceremony to mark the LTTE chief ‘s birthday. Some LTTE members criticized Holser Babu’s lavish Pongal celebration for Prabhakaran’s 50th birthday as overly sycophantic and wasteful. They discreetly shared their disapproval among trusted circles within the LTTE, wary of potential repercussions. Interestingly, our source, who was with Prabhakaran at the time, revealed that when Prabhakaran learned about the grand Pongal ceremony, he reacted with visible happiness and delight, indicating his appreciation for such grand gestures.
Colonel Shankar: The LTTE’s Infamous ‘Thagaadu’ and His Effects on Mahathaya
Colonel Shankar, in particular, was widely known for his flattery attitude towards his Leader. In the Sri Lankan Tamil context, the terms ‘Thagaadu vaithal’ (தகடு வைத்தல்) or ‘Anduthal’ (அண்டுதல்) describe acts of sneaking or snitching. Shankar earned the nickname ‘Thagaadu’ Shankar or ‘Andal Master’ for his tendency to snitch on others within the LTTE to his boss. Even today, former high-ranking LTTE officers, whether living in Sri Lanka after rehabilitation or those who have escaped abroad, still refer to him by the moniker ‘Thagaadu’ Shankar in their conversations. To write this series of articles, I engaged in an extensive discussion with a former high-ranking member of the LTTE. Throughout our conversation, this individual repeatedly referred to Shankar as ‘Thagadu’ Shankar. The consistent use of this nickname, which essentially means a snitch or informant, highlights Shankar’s particular reputation and perception among his peers in the LTTE.
Shankar reportedly harboured a dislike for Mahathaya, although the reasons are known only to Shankar himself. Credible sources revealed to the Jaffna Monitor that Shankar systematically reported negative information about Mahathaya to Prabhakaran. This snitching likely influenced Prabhakaran’s perceptions and decisions regarding Mahathaya.
A valuable source shared an intriguing anecdote with the Jaffna Monitor, revealing an incident highlighting the internal dynamics and trust issues within the LTTE leadership. The incident occurred during a period of peace with the Premadasa government. ‘Thenisai’ Sellappa, a well-known Tamil folk music exponent and staunch supporter of the LTTE, visited an LTTE-controlled area from India. One of the events organized by the LTTE took place on the city grounds in Vavuniya in front of the Vavuniya court. Mahathaya was giving the introductory speech at the stadium. During this event, the source encountered Shankar, who had a friendly rapport with the source. He pointed to Mahathaya and remarked, “Michael made a mistake worthy of killing him.” Mahathaya was also called Michael, but only by a few people within the LTTE, including Shankar. This statement piqued the source’s curiosity, prompting further inquiry.
Shankar then disclosed critical operational details about the LTTE’s internal communication system. He explained that in those days, every LTTE base had a yellow box where fighters could directly write letters to their Leader, Prabhakaran. These letters were meant to be confidential and directly delivered to Prabhakaran without any intermediaries reading them. While in the Jaffna region, a dedicated LTTE cadre loyal to Prabhakaran was appointed to collect these letters from each Base, this system was not feasible in more remote areas like the Vanni region. In these places, the Base in charge, who had a key to the yellow box, was responsible for collecting and forwarding the letters to Prabhakaran. According to Shankar, Mahathaya violated this protocol by opening and reading these letters before they reached Prabhakaran, a significant breach of trust and loyalty in the eyes of both Prabhakaran and the LTTE.
The source believed that Shankar, known for his tendency to snitch on Prabhakaran, would have undoubtedly informed him about this incident. This report would have further increased the resentment and insecurity that Prabhakaran already harboured towards Mahathaya. Our source believes that this event implies Mahathaya’s readiness to defy Prabhakaran, showing a willingness to breach established protocols and ignore Prabhakaran’s orders. Such actions represented a notable departure from the strict loyalty and obedience demanded within the LTTE’s hierarchical framework.
Balasingham’s Reservations About Mahathaya
Anton Balasingham, the chief strategist of the LTTE, also harbored a dislike for Mahathaya, as revealed by sources close to the LTTE. Affectionately known within the organization as Bala Anna, Balasingham had specific reservations about Shankar and Mahathaya despite his occasional differences with various figures, including Prabhakaran. Credible sources indicate that Balasingham’s distrust and disbelief in Mahathaya might have influenced the mindset of the LTTE’s Leader, Prabhakaran. An interesting story shared by our source highlights Balasingham’s influence. Following Mahathaya’s execution, Prabhakaran was considering appointing Shankar as the new head of the political wing. However, Balasingham, who strongly opposed both Shankar and Mahathaya, intervened. His intervention was crucial in convincing Prabhakaran to select Thamilselvan as the LTTE’s political commissar in 1994.
Pottu Amman’s Ascendancy and Mahathaya’s Decline in the LTTE
Sources closely associated with Mahathaya describe him as somewhat immature in many aspects. His nature as a people person rendered him highly emotional, and he was known for harbouring grudges. Like a child, this tendency to take offence quickly led to him ceasing communication with other leaders within the LTTE. Figures like Shankar, Anton Balasingham, and other prominent members developed a dislike for Mahathaya primarily due to these childish behaviours.
Another individual who disliked Mahathaya within the LTTE was Pottu Amman, the intelligence chief of the LTTE; however, in the case of Pottu Amman, his dislike for Mahathaya was not just a matter of personal animosity. Credible sources conveyed to the Jaffna Monitor that Pottu Amman’s aversion towards Mahathaya was driven by his own agenda. They point out that Pottu Amman had a particular plan concerning Mahathaya. Observing the LTTE’s history, they mentioned a clear, direct correlation between the decline of Mahathaya and the ascent of Pottu Amman within the organization’s hierarchy.
Pottu Amman assumed leadership of the LTTE’s intelligence wing in mid-1988, holding the position for 21 years until the LTTE’s military defeat in May 2009. While his role as second-in-command was never formally declared, he effectively held this position by 2009. Initially, during Mahathaya’s tenure as the LTTE’s number 2, Pottu Amman’s presence within the organization was less prominent. However, with the gradual decline of Mahathaya’s influence, Pottu Amman’s stature within the LTTE grew, ultimately leading him to become the de facto second-in- command.
